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International 
Environmental 
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Daniel Bodansky 
I.  What's the Problem? 
The turning point of the movie, Moneyball, comes when Brad Pitt’s character, Billy Beane, 
asks the question, “What’s the problem?”  Beane is the general manager of the Oakland 
Athletics baseball team, which needs to rebuild after losing several key players.  The team's 
scouts, with whom Beane is meeting, see the problem in traditional terms, as finding 
replacement players similar to the ones who have left.  But Beane defines the problem 
differently.  For him, the problem is, how can a poor team such as the Athletics compete 
against rich teams?  His reconceptualization did not change the fundamentals of what needed 
to be done — acquiring new players who could help win games.  But it directed attention to 
different aspects of that challenge, and led Beane to develop a new strategy, now known 
simply as "Moneyball," aimed at identifying undervalued players who can be acquired 
cheaply. 
International environmental law is, of course, very different from baseball. But in 
international environmental law as in any field, a crucial first step is to define the problem, 
since our definition of the international environmental problématique helps define what we 
see as answers.  
Some see the problem facing international environmental law as weak standards and even 
weaker enforcement.  This conceptualization of the problem suggests a simple answer, 
namely to develop international environmental regimes with “teeth,” which more closely 
resemble domestic law.1  In a similar vein, Don Anton argues that the problem faced by 
international environmental law is conceptual:  the field has been co-opted by the 
“misshapen,” “retrograde” concept of sustainable development, which has redirected attention 
from environmental protection to economic growth.2  This conceptualization of the problem 
leads him to suggest, as an answer, that “we need to put the objective of environmental 
 
1. See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 
259 (1992). 
2. Donald K. Anton, The "Thirty-Percent Solution" and the Future of International Environmental 
Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 209 (2013). 
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protection front and centre as the primary objective of international environmental 
diplomacy, international environmental policy, and international environmental law.”3 
Certainly, weak standards and weak enforcement are problems with international 
environmental law.  So too is the ineffectiveness of international environmental law in solving 
pressing problems such as climate change, as John McArthur emphasizes.4  Thus, more 
stringent rules, with stronger enforcement, would represent answers.  But they gloss over the 
hardest issue:  How do we get from here to there?  What has prevented the adoption of 
stronger standards and enforcement, and how do we address these obstacles?  In this respect, 
proposals along these lines are a bit reminiscent of Steve Martin’s classic monologue, “How to 
Become a Millionaire and Never Pay Taxes,” in which Martin begins, “First, get a million 
dollars.” 
The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law ("AC") focuses on the how-do-we-
get-from-here-to-there issue.  And this requires us to start from our current position, namely, 
a world dominated by sovereign states, who are reluctant to agree to strong standards and 
strong enforcement.5  We may deplore this situation.  We may want to change it.  And we 
may think that the process of change has already begun.  But denying this reality will be no 
more effective than King Canute commanding the tides to stop.  Instead, we must develop 
strategies that recognize our current predicament and try to work around it ‒ for example, by 
relying more on non-state actors, who are playing an increasingly important role in 
international politics, or through strategies that encourage states to change their preferences 
or that make it easier for them to agree.   
My concern with the question, "How do we move from here to there?" led me in two 
directions in writing AC:  first, to a focus on process, and second, to a multi-disciplinary 
approach that draws on fields such as political science, economics, and, to a more limited 
degree, philosophy, sociology, and anthropology in attempting to understand the behavior of 
key actors.  The result is a book that focuses on “international law in action,” as Sandrine 
Maljean-Dubois and Vanessa Richards put it, examining the “life cycle” of norms from 
conception to implementation to enforcement.6  Reflecting my experience as a U.S. 
government negotiator, NGO adviser, and UN consultant, the book aims to be pragmatic.  
Although it is theoretical, it tries to provide a real-world perspective on how international 
environmental works ‒ and sometimes doesn’t work ‒ using concrete examples to illustrate 
its theoretical points.  
In this brief essay, I will attempt to respond to the very insightful and valuable comments 
of my eight reviewers.  Rather than discuss each review individually, I will address them 
thematically.  But, before beginning, let me say at the outset what an honor it is to have my 
 
3. Id.  
4. John Burritt McArthur, International Environmental Law: Can It Overcome Its Weaknesses to 
Devise an Effective Response to Global Warming?, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 253 (2013). 
5. This framing reflects my background as an "(environmentally inspired) international lawyer" rather 
than an "(internationally inspired) environmental lawyer," to use the terms very usefully introduced 
by Jae-Hyup Lee in his review.  Jae-Hyup Lee, International Law as an Art and a Craft, 10 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 229 (2013). 
6. Sandrine Maljean-Dubois & Vanessa Richards, Book Review: Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of 
International Environmental Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 241 (2012). 
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book be the subject of this symposium, and how much I appreciate not only the kind words of 
my reviewers, but also their occasionally strong criticisms.  I am grateful to have the 
opportunity to be part of a conversation with so many interesting scholars, with so many 
valuable ideas.  
II.  A Focus on Process 
In contrast to other treatises on international environmental law, AC focuses on the 
process by which international environmental norms emerge and are implemented, rather 
than on the content of these norms.  How and why do international environmental norms 
arise? In what ways do they affect behavior?  Do they change what states and individuals 
actually do, and, if so, why? How effective are they in solving international environmental 
problems?  These are the sorts of questions I examine in AC.  Accordingly, the book is not 
organized doctrinally, in terms of air pollution, marine pollution, chemicals, and so forth.  
Instead, it is organized thematically, with chapters on such topics as the causes of 
environmental problems, the varieties of international norms, the obstacles to international 
cooperation, the design of international agreements, policy implementation, enforcement and 
effectiveness. 
In his review, Ilias Plakokefalos notes that “looking at law as a process is certainly not a 
novel idea.”7  Past proponents of a process-oriented approach have included Myres McDougal 
and Harold Lasswell, founders of the so-called New Haven school;8 Henry Hart and Albert 
Sachs in their classic casebook, the Legal Process;9 and Abram Chayes, who applied a process-
oriented approach to international law beginning with his 1968 textbook on the international 
legal process10 and continuing through his much later work on compliance theory.11   The 
McDougal-Lasswell approach has indeed been applied to international environmental law in 
the work of Jan Schneider, World Public Order of the Environment.12  I am indebted to these 
earlier process-oriented writers and, in particular, to Michael Reisman, who was my teacher 
in law school and who had a profound influence on how I think about international law. 
Despite my New Haven school pedigree, my approach in AC is closer to that of Hart & 
Sacks and Chayes than to McDougal & Lasswell.  In describing what is distinctive about my 
book, I did not mean to suggest that focusing on process is itself novel.  As the book 
acknowledges, process issues have received increasing attention in recent years in the study 
of international environmental law.  My only claim was that the standard treatises on 
international environmental law focus more on substance than on process and that therefore 
 
7. Ilias Plakokefalos, Process and Rules in International Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L.  297 (2013). 
8. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, Theories about International Law: 
Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 177 (1968). 
9. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & HENRY MELVIN HART, HART & SACKS' THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (2001). 
10. ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: 
MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE (1968). 
11. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) 
12. JAN SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL 
ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1979). 
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there is a niche for a work like AC, which examines the international environmental process 
as a whole, from beginning to end, synthesizing recent research on international 
environmental negotiations, treaty design, social norms, policy implementation, and 
effectiveness. 
Plakokefalos questions whether focusing on process is enough, and suggests that 
international environmental law “has reached a level of maturity that allows for the adoption 
of more concrete, legally binding obligations.”13  I agree.  My focus on process does not mean 
that I think that international environmental law is  “just a process wherein decision making 
will take place without ever reaching a substantive result,”14 any more than a study of the 
car-making process should be seen as denying the existence of cars.  Hart & Sacks believed 
that a defining feature of the legal process is that it produces "institutional settlements" 
through the prescription of rules, the adoption of regulations, and decisions in particular 
cases.15  In the world of international environmental law, these institutional settlements can 
take many forms: treaties, decisions, resolutions, codes of conduct, and sometimes even cases.  
Often the process of institutional settlement produces substantive rules, like the very detailed 
obligations in the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances.  
Indeed, one of the remarkable features of the international environmental process is that, 
despite the absence of a legislature, so much substantive law has developed.  Of course, the 
process of institutional settlement does not stop the legal process from continuing, since rules 
and decisions must themselves be interpreted and applied.  But they represent at least 
momentary points of repose.  As I call them elsewhere, they represent punctuation marks in 
the ongoing flow of international environmental law.16 
III. Three Perspectives 
In AC, I describe three general perspectives on international environmental law.  First, 
one can describe the existing rules and processes.  I call this the doctrinal approach, although 
doctrine in this context should be understood as encompassing procedure as well as substance 
— what H.L.A. Hart described as secondary as well as primary rules.17  Second, one can 
explain how international environmental law works — why we have the rules and procedures 
we do and how they influence behavior.  Third, we can prescribe what the law should be, both 
procedurally and substantively.  AC addresses all three of these perspectives, but it focuses 
primarily on the first two.   
With respect to the explanatory perspective, Plakokefalos describes my approach as a 
“refined exercise of eclecticism,”18 McArthur as a “garbage can” approach.19  The two 
descriptions amount to more or less the same thing, and I am happy to accept either one.  In 
 
13. Plakokefalos, supra note 7. 
14. Id.  
15. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & HART, supra note 9. 
16. Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 
18 YALE J. I.L. 451, 493 (1993) (describing the UN Framework Convention as a "punctuation mark 
in an ongoing process of negotiation"). 
17. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
18. Plakokefalos, supra note 7. 
19. McArthur, supra note 4. 
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trying to understood how international environmental rules emerge and influence behavior, I 
take an inclusive approach, examining a wide range of causal factors and mechanisms, 
including interests, power, values, and knowledge.  In general, my analysis is "actor-
oriented,"20 but I also try to include other factors such as international structure and domestic 
politics. 
As McArthur notes, this eclectic approach does not “generate predictions.”21  But it at least 
has the merit of more accurately reflecting how international environmental law actually 
works than the reductionist theories of political scientists, which tend to focus on a single 
explanatory factor such as interests, power, or knowledge.  And because I think that 
international environmental is more an art and a craft than a science, I regard prediction as 
virtually impossible anyway.  
Despite my eclecticism, several reviewers suggest that my account undervalues or even 
misses important causal factors.  Victor Flatt, for example, suggests that the concepts of 
rights, equity and human entitlement have played a bigger role in the development of 
international environmental law than my account suggests.22  I think his point is well taken, 
and agree that perceptions of equity can play an important role in influencing behavior.  In 
“fair division” games, for example, individuals typically prefer to get nothing than to accept a 
division of the pie that they regard as unfair.23  Nevertheless, I am a bit skeptical of Flatt’s 
claim about the causal importance of equity in the climate change regime.  Although 
developing countries have framed many of their arguments in equity terms, my sense is that 
at least some of this rhetoric is a mask for self-interested positions.24  And to the extent that 
equity has played a role in the negotiations, it has been a largely negative one, impeding 
efforts to reach agreement.  
Don Anton’s argument is similar in kind to Flatt’s, only Anton focuses on the causal role of 
sustainable development rather than equity.  Like Flatt, Anton believes that concepts matter.  
Indeed, he suggests that the concept of sustainable development is largely to blame for the 
failures of international environmental law.25  Although I agree that ideas matter, I am not so 
sure about Anton's specific claim about sustainable development.  In order to test this claim, 
we would need to investigate the causal pathways by which concepts like sustainable 
development are used by, and in turn influence, the various actors in the international 
environmental process.  And we would need to explore how the concept of sustainable 
development relates to other causal factors such as interests and power.  
With respect to doctrine, AC focuses on what H.L.A. Hart refers to as secondary rather 
than primary rules: the rules about how international environmental law develops, is 
 
20. Lee, supra note 5. 
21. McArthur, supra note 4. 
22. Victor B. Flatt, Clearing Some Worldwide Haze: Daniel Bodansky’s The Art and Craft of 
International Envrionmental Law, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 220 (2013). 
23. Art and Craft, at 306 n. 24 and accompanying text (discussing fair division games). 
24. For a similar view, see David G. Victor, The Regulation of Greenhouse Gases ‒ Does Fairness 
Matter?, in FAIR WEATHER? EQUITY CONCERNS IN CLIMATE CHANGE (F. Toth ed. 1999). 
25. Anton, supra note 2, at 217 (“This change from a discourse of international environmental law, with 
a specific focus on environmental protection, to rhetoric bound up with international law in the field 
of sustainable development, with its focus on economic growth, has had a destructive impact.”). 
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interpreted and enforced, rather than the substantive rules themselves.  Since I believe 
treaties are the source of most international environmental rules, I focus on issues of treaty 
design and implementation.  These are the subjects of Chapters 8, 10 and 11, which are the 
heart of the book. 
The reviews say comparatively little about these chapters, focusing instead on my 
discussion of customary law and state responsibility.  Plakokefalos, in particular, criticizes 
my discussion of whether the duty to prevent is a rule of customary international law, noting 
that since it is a duty of conduct rather than result, “The fact that states pollute on a daily 
basis does not automatically mean that the rule is breached on a daily basis too.”26  This 
criticism is well taken, and I agree that the relevant question for the rule's customary law 
status is whether states have exercised due diligence to prevent transboundary pollution, 
rather than whether pollution has occurred.  But since I am unaware of any systematic study 
that would answer this question, I believe that the customary status of the duty to prevent 
remains uncertain, even if understood as a duty of conduct rather than of result. 
 As Plakokefalos acutely notes, my views on customary international law have evolved,27 
and I doubt that Chapter 9 of AC will be my last word on the subject.  In an earlier work, I 
argued that the purported norms of customary international law really represent "declarative 
law," and are best understood as general principles rather than custom.28  In AC, I take a 
more pluralist view, arguing that some customary norms may emerge through a secondary 
process of customary lawmaking and others as social norms.  Moreover, with respect to the 
significance of customary law and state responsibility, I agree that, in the context of dispute 
resolution, they have an important role to play.  While international environmental litigation 
remains rare, so this role remains small, it is likely to grow. 
Compared to the explanatory and doctrinal perspectives, AC devotes less space to the 
policy perspective, with the exception of Chapter 4, which surveys the various goals and 
regulatory instruments of international environmental policy.  Although the book endorses a 
weak form of cost-benefit analysis, it does not suggest any new “grand discourse” of the kind 
that Lee suggests,29 or take a position about the desirability of deliberative democracy, an 
idea implicitly propounded by Stephanie Tai.30   Of course, my hope, in writing a book for the 
general public, was that if people better understood how international environmental law 
works, this would contribute to more informed, democratic discussions.  So I am flattered that 
Tai thinks that my book might make a contribution in this regard. But I do not think 
anything in my book suggests that international environmental law, in its current state of 
development, particularly promotes deliberative democracy.  Indeed, to the extent that 
 
26. Plakokefalos, supra note 7.  Plakokefalos's criticism could be seen, at least in part, as directed at my 
explanatory account, arguing that I give insufficient weight to international discourse.  As he claims 
with respect to customary international law, “the way states speak to each other sometimes does 
make a significant difference.” But I think Plakokefalos is mostly concerned about my doctrinal, not 
my explanatory, account. 
27. Id.  
28. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 105 (1995). 
29. Lee, supra note 5 
30. Stephanie Tai, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law as Foundation for 
Constructive Deliberative Democratic Consultations, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 309 (2013). 
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interstate negotiations still play a crucial in the international environmental process, that 
process more typically involves positional bargaining than deliberation about the public good. 
Of my reviewers, Don Anton is the most clearly normative, leveling strong criticisms at the 
concept of sustainable development.31 As a pragmatist rather than an absolutist, I think the 
story is more complex, with competing considerations that must be balanced.  Environmental 
protection is a critical objective, but so too are alleviating poverty, providing people with 
sufficient food and clean drinking water, raising standards of living, and so forth.  So I tend to 
see the competition between environmental protection and economic development in various 
shades of grey, rather than in black and white.  But, in any event, the book is less about the 
ends of international environmental law than about the processes by which it develops and 
influences behavior. 
IV.  Mea Culpas 
Needless to say, in a relatively short book about a large field, there are many lacunae.  For 
example, as Maljean-Dubois & Richards note, the book has little to say about the relationship 
between international environmental law and other fields such as human rights and 
international trade,32 or about the relationship of global and regional efforts or other issues of 
scale.33  I have written about some of these topics elsewhere34 and agree that they are 
important.  All I can say in response is that my book was intended to provide a brief, readable 
introduction to the international environmental law process, and inevitably had to downplay 
some topics. 
To my mind the biggest gap in the book is the one highlighted by Oren Perez and seconded 
by Jae-Hyup Lee, concerning private transnational environmental regulation (PTER).35  
Although I refer in a number of places to the role of private actors and private regulatory 
standards, I do not analyze the growth of private standard-setting in any systematic way.  So 
I think Perez is entirely correct in calling this a "significant blind spot." I am not sure 
whether I would go so far as to describe PTER as having reached a "structural tipping point" 
that has made it an "ordered domain" with the "capacity for introspection, coordination and 
cross-regime synergy.”36  But I agree that whether PTER schemes constitute law depends on 
the “state of mind of the actors that comprise the relevant community,” so prejudging their 
legal status is unwarranted.  Moreover, I couldn't agree more that this gap in my book 
"should be seen as an invitation for further scholarly work," including about the linkages 
between PTER and treaties. 
 
31. Anton, supra note 2. 
32. Maljean-Dubois & Richards, supra note 6. 
33. Id.  
34. Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 GA J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 511 (2010); Daniel Bodansky & Jessica Laurence, Trade and Environment, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 505 (Daniel Bethlehem, Donald McRae, Rodney Neufeld 
& Isabelle van Damme eds. 2009).  
35. Oren Perez, International Environmental Law as a Field of Multi-Polar Governance: The Case of 
Private Transnational Environmental Regulation, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 284 (2013); Lee, supra 
note 5. 
36. Perez, supra note 35. 
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V.  Should We Be Optimistic? 
AC seeks to describe the various tools that international environmental law has developed 
to try to move the ball forward.  Will these tools be enough to bring us across the finish line?  
Only time will tell.  I hope so, but there is significant room for doubt. 
McArthur describes me as an optimist about international environmental law, saying that 
I have “faith that the gradual evolution of environmental norms and the progress in 
developing new procedures to reach and extend agreements will keep pace with 
environmental problems.”37   But, after spending much of the last two decades involved in the 
climate change negotiations, with little to show for it, I am acutely aware of the limitations of 
international environmental law.  In AC, I take issue not only with cynics who dismiss 
international environmental law as a sham, but also with true believers who see it as a 
panacea.  As I emphasize, international environmental law can play a constructive role, but 
that is all.  It can provide part, but only part, of the answer.  It is what I call a 30% solution.  
Solving a problem such as climate change will depend on many other factors as well, and may 
depend ultimately more on moral outrage than on the kind of “cool analysis” exemplified in 
AC.  My claim in AC is only that international environmental law has developed an 
innovative toolkit that allows it — sometimes — to play a positive role.  This is a 
comparatively modest claim, but one that I think best reflects our current reality.  
 
37. McArthur, supra note 4. 
